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JAMES KEYTE:

Hi, everybody, and welcome to

our first virtual Fireside Chat in Fordham’s first
virtual conference.

I think most everybody knows who

we are going to have the chat with today — Barry Hawk
and Bill Kovacic — but, just in case, I will give a
very quick overview.
Barry Hawk founded the Fordham Competition
Law Institute forty-seven years ago.

I think he
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probably had a ponytail at the time.
BARRY HAWK:
JAMES KEYTE:

No.

The ponytail was later.

Barry has always been known as

an incredibly creative, interesting free thinker in
antitrust, and a great professor.
Skadden Arps, where I ended up at one point
actually, in 1989 hired Barry basically to start the
Brussels office because he was better known in
Brussels than most people in Brussels to the European
Commissioners and the Member States.

He did a great

job expanding that office for Skadden.
Barry has written many articles, several
books at this point, one of which we will talk about,
and he is a close friend and mentor.
Bill Kovacic — I don’t even know what to say
— also I consider a close friend and mentor.
just iconic in our industry.

Bill is

I have never really

looked up what that means, but if I did, Bill would be
all those things.
Bill has also become iconic in other
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countries, where they have approached Bill and asked
him, “Please help me write or rewrite my antitrust
laws.”

What could be more confirmatory than having

countries do that?
Bill has written extensively.
Chairman of the FTC.

He was

He also speaks in full

paragraphs that are beautiful, so you never have to do
any editing of anything that he has said.
With that, let’s have a chat.
I want to start with Barry and ask you to
tell us briefly about the book you just finished.
What is it?

Why did you write it?

BARRY HAWK:

Just quickly on the book,

Antitrust and Competition Laws is a history of
antitrust and competition laws — I use these terms
interchangeably — over the centuries.1

I’m interested

in history because I like stories — I read mystery
stories, so I read history and like to write about it.
The book has chapters

1

on laws around the world

http://www.jurispub.com/Antitrust-and-Competition-Laws.html.

4

before 1880 (including Athens, Rome, India, China, the
Islamic world and medieval/early modern Europe), the
United States, the European Union, and then post-1990
jurisdictions. Sothe book brings antitrust history
to the present.

up

The book offers some thoughts on the

present debate about antitrust

which was not my

intention when I started.
You asked why I wrote it and whether it’s
relevant at all.

Well, Mark Twain said, “History does

not repeat itself, but history rhymes a lot.”
captured many things very well.

Twain

He certainly

described the gist of history in one sentence.
I found a lot of rhymes, not surprisingly,
because history deals with human beings: history
changes and it changes for a variety of reasons; it’s
rarely a single reason.
And that is true of competition law.

It has

changed, I would argue, for three sets of reasons, and
the importance of each set varies during time periods
and societies: (1) changes in economic conditions; (2)
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developments in economic theory or economic thinking
(what had been called political economy before modern
economics); and (3) politics or shifting political
interests — I am using “politics” in a neutral sense.
So economic conditions, economic theory, and politics.
The history of cartels is one example.
Beginning in the 19th century, the Europeans tolerated
cartels, and that toleration ended after the Second
World War.

That roughly one-hundred-year toleration

was an historical aberration.

Before that, Europeans

pretty much had legal prohibitions on cartels.

The

reason for the century of toleration and the ending of
the period after the war was a political decision
rather than changes in economic conditions or economic
theory.
Another example of a preindustrial
combination of conditions, theory, and politics is the
European medieval and early modern bans on
forestalling.

Forestalling was going to a farmer and

buying grain from the farmer rather than letting the
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farmer go to the local village market to sell his
grain.
Forestalling bans are found throughout
Western Europe.

They end during the 19th century,

because economic conditions changed as agricultural
markets become less isolated. And starting with the
French thinkers (the philosophes)and ultimately Adam
Smith, economic theory developed to believe that
middlemen and free trade

improved supply and demand.

Third, it took a hundred years under English
common law for the people who were benefiting from
free trade to have the political power to finally
overcome the resistance of English courts to get
Parliament to repeal the ban to enforce the law.
A modern example in the United States of
politics, conditions (usually economic conditions),
and theory started with what I call the expansionary
period of U.S. antitrust law, which started in and
ends sometime in the late 1970s.

When I listen to a

lot of discussions today, it’s like nobody was born
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before 1980; it’s like everything started in 1980.
Well, from 1937 to the end of the 1970s was
clearly the most expansionary period of U.S. antitrust
law — you can’t argue about that. For example,
vertical and horizontal mergers with market shares
under 10% were condemned. Numerous section 2
challenges were brought against large successful U.S.
firms.
Why?
owed more to

The launch of the expansionary period
politics than changes in

economic

conditions or developments in economic theory.
Franklin Roosevelt in his first term wanted
cooperation to combat the effects of the Depression.
He reversed course

after he was reelected in 1936.

President Roosevelt was very pragmatic — concluding
that if cooperation is not working, then the U.S.
should try competition.

He hired Robert Jackson, then

Thurman Arnold — boom! All of a sudden, antitrust,
which had been very quiet since 1921, became very
aggressive.
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Politics started this, but after the Second
World War economic conditions and economic theory
reinforced this aggressive or expansionary antitrust.
If you forced me to pick one economic
condition which is maybe the most important, it is the
prevailing assumption or belief about the persistence
of market power.

For several decades after World War

II, if a firm like General Motors or duPont had a lot
of market power, they faced little to no foreign or
potential competition; therefore, it wasreasonable to
assume that their market power would persist absent
antitrust intervention.
You also had economic theory — Donald
Turner, Carl Kaysen, Joe Bain.

These were highly

respected and influential economists who advances the
so-called structuralist paradigm which held:

“If

you’ve got concentration that leads to bad
performance.”
JAMES KEYTE:

Barry, I’m giving you thirty

seconds to wrap this point up and then I am going to
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turn to Bill, but it is a key transitional point.
BARRY HAWK:

That’s fine.

Then what I call the retrenchment era begins
in the 1970s, which is the present era.

You’ve got a

change in economic conditions — only a minority now
thought

that General Motors was going to continue

have dominance --- given the introduction of foreign
competition.

The economic theories changed with

challenge of the structuralists.

the

And you have one new

thing that may be unique in history — that’s what I
will call a worldview or weltenschauung which reflects
an inhospitality toward the application of antitrust
law, resting on concerns about the cost of the system
and assumptions about economic conditions like market
power.
Fine.

I’ll stop.

JAMES KEYTE:

All right.

As all of us who

know Barry know, if I didn’t stop you, Barry, you
would go on — and everything is quite interesting —
and we will get back to these same points after we
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hear a little bit from Bill.
Bill, I have a pretty broad question for
you.

It seems that antitrust is in kind of a new

inflection point where people are anticipating
something really coming from antitrust — whether it’s
in Big Tech, mergers, the digital economy — but there
sometimes seems to be a gap between what is aspired to
and what can be delivered, whether it is in
enforcement in courts or elsewhere.
I want to know, do you think that’s right;
have you seen it before; what has been your
experience; and then relate it to where we are today?
BILL KOVACIC:

First, James, thanks for the

chance to be part of this chat, especially with Barry,
who is one of the handful of people who created the
community that we call the global community of
competition policy people with Fordham as the hub, and
it is wonderful to watch you continue that tradition
of the school.

So thanks for the chance to be here,

and great honor to Barry for his work.
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I think we are in a crucial transition of
the kind you described, and Barry captures precisely
the conditions that tend to cause this type of
transition:
• Economic upheaval that causes great
distress;
• A change in the literature — by my count,
there have been fifteen significant books published in
the last two years that raise the question about
whether our treatment of dominant firms and mergers
has been adequate and decisively saying “No.”

So a

powerful change in the literature; and
• A political mood that has changed as well,
with, as we saw earlier this week, demands in the
House Judiciary Subcommittee report for a fundamental
retooling of the antitrust system.
I think what is missing in this is the
appreciation for why we fall short in the way that you
mentioned before.
In the late 1970s, I joined the FTC for the
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first time and we were coming to the end of a decade
in which the Department of Justice and the FTC
undertook a sweeping program of efforts to restructure
concentrated industries — petroleum, breakfast cereal,
computers, telecommunications, bread, chemicals — a
host of areas.
I think what was missing was an appreciation
for the mismatch between commitments and capabilities.
If you are going to take on all those battles, you
have to have an extraordinarily capable team of
professionals in the enforcement agencies to do that.
I think a major gap in the House report is
its failure to address the implementation challenges.
There is an admonition in the report that says, “We
need more resources.”

We don’t just need more bodies;

we need elite people, people who are really superior
in their ability not just to fight one big case at a
time, but to fight several.
When you look at our past experience, you
can see the resources that defendants will mobilize to
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protect existing business models and market
structures, and at the FTC so many matters came to
grief in the late 1970s and early 1980s because the
FTC, and to some extent the Department of Justice,
were simply overwhelmed by the talents that were being
brought to bear against them.
The suggestion that Alison Jones, my
colleague at King’s College, and I made to the House
Committee in our written comments was: You not only
have to raise the budgets dramatically, but you have
to raise the compensation levels.

Alison and I

suggested that you at least have to put the
competition agencies on the same footing as the
financial services regulators — do what we did for the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which
basically means a 20 percent bump in the federal pay
scale.
Our suggestion was if you want to go to the
moon you have to pay for it.

Our idea was in the case

of the FTC to raise the budget from roughly $300
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million to $1 billion a year, do it for ten years, and
go out and hire the best.

Be willing in many

instances to pay market rates to get the best
litigators, the best economists, and — very important
— the best technologists.
Our simple point was: if you are promising
to go to the moon but you are providing resources and
compensation that doesn’t match, you will be lucky to
get to Kansas City.
JAMES KEYTE: That’s excellent, and it leads
into a question for both of you and also some of the
questions that I have been getting in some chat.
There is some enthusiasm there, Bill, and
Barry has brought the broad perspective to where we
are now.

I want to understand whether your views of

antitrust enforcement and principles, really the
underlying principles — the analytical framework, the
consumer welfare standard — have they changed over the
years?

What was it twenty years ago, forty years ago

— not to get into too many decades — and has it
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evolved, and in what ways?
I will start with you, Barry.
BARRY HAWK: History is relevant.

When we

start out in 1890, it’s the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
not the Sherman Competition Act.

The popular concern

was about the effects of large firms that often were
organized as trusts.Over the years, the trust as a
form of business organization disappeared.
Importantly, the antitrust laws or the Sherman Act
went from an antitrust act to a competition act.
There is a lot of debate about what competition means,
but competition was the essential element of antitrust
law.
Then, in the 1970s competition seems to have
transitioned into consumer welfare.
about consumer welfare.

Today we talk

The nature and importance of

a distinction between consumer welfare and competition
is not entirely clear to me. I think there are
different notions of competition and different notions
of consumer welfare.

You can blend them, play with
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them — but I will just stop there.
I don’t see the history of the United States
so much in terms of the concept of competition or
consumer welfare.

I am not seeing it that way.

JAMES KEYTE:
BILL KOVACIC:
dramatically.

Bill?
Yes, it has changed

If you want to read two landmarks from

the 1960s that identify the broad egalitarian vision,
read the Brown Shoe merger decision from 1962 and read
the Procter & Gamble merger decision from later in the
decade.

Both of these consciously embrace a broad

vision of what competition law should do.
Most significantly, the last page or so of
the Brown Shoe merger decision says:

“We willingly

sacrifice efficiency benefits of this vertical merger
for the sake of preserving a more egalitarian business
environment because that is what Congress wanted in
1960 and we are delivering on that.”
That language disappeared from the Supreme
Court decisions basically going from Brunswick in 1977

17

forward.

It just evaporates.
Why does that happen?

In part because there

is an economic upheaval going on where the United
States is no longer preeminent, as it was in 1962,
with Japanese and German producers suddenly becoming
very effective competitors, and courts understanding
this and not willing to cast efficiency aside.
But you had the academic consensus that
said, “This has to happen as well.”

It wasn’t Judge

Bob Bork in The Antitrust Paradox in 1978; it was Phil
Areeda and Don Turner in the first three volumes of
the Antitrust Treatise published in 1978, where Areeda
and Turner said: “These broader egalitarian goals in
the legislative history and in earlier cases — yes, of
course ignore them.”
them?”

And why do they say “ignore

Because you cannot formulate what they called

an “administrable framework” for making all of these
goals effective in individual cases and trading them
off as you want to.
The modern contest brings us back to that
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fundamental issue and says, “Yes, you can do these
things” — and that’s in the House report.

The House

report very specifically says, “Repudiate the consumer
welfare vision; bring antitrust back to its original
roots in this broader vision of what competition law
should accomplish.”
JAMES KEYTE:
said.

Bill and Barry, very well

There is a challenge, of course, and then what

you can do with that with where courts are now.
That brings me to my last question for both
of you: Where do you think these investigations of Big
Tech are going to land both in terms of at the DOJ and
the FTC and also in light of where we are in our
jurisprudence?
BARRY HAWK:

If there is going to be a

transition, as you put it, or an ending of this
present retrenchment era, you have to deal with this
inhospitality tradition in the courts — I’m calling it
the inhospitality tradition — or worldview, i.e. a
weltenschauung.

It’s what Olivier Guersent two weeks
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ago termed “legal culture,” which is pretty much
same thing.

the

He said, “The Americans have a different

legal culture.”
Inhospitality toward antitrust law is well
documented — it started with Matsushita,2 right? — and
that has to be dealt with.

I see that as the major

obstacle to change.
If you want “reforms,” like the House Report, the
biggest obstacle is the courts right now.

There are

different ways of dealing with that problem, if that’s
the problem.
How can reformers respond?

It is very

difficult to challenge a court’s worldview or legal
culture. There are different ways of dealing with
this. You can do it directly — you can change the
court, change the judges.

You can enact new

legislation as the Parliament did in 1841 when
repealing forestalling bans.
BILL KOVACIC:

2

I think by the end of this

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986).
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calendar year we are going to see major monopolization
lawsuits filed by the Department of Justice against
Google, by the Federal Trade Commission dealing with
Facebook, and by the State Attorneys General either
joining or bringing additional cases in both respects.
We are going to have the next big wave of
monopolization cases.
They face a foreboding judicial gauntlet.
It’s an extremely demanding set of standards — not
impossible.

The challenge is to take the footholds

that still exist and map out a path to the summit
using favorable court of appeals precedents like
Microsoft as well.
So there is a way to get there, but there
are a lot of dead bodies along the way on what’s
called “the death zone on Everest.”
as you’re going up.

You will see them

You have to be very careful to

try to make it to the summit.

It is a hard climb and

dangerous.
I think there is a way there, as both
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agencies and all of the public enforcement officials
now are saying, “We have changed our risk appetite.
We are willing to take that chance.”
I think what Congress is saying is, “Even if
you lose, it’s worth bringing the cases; and then, if
you lose them all, that is why we are going to change
the law.”
That is why they have the parallel
suggestion in the report to change the law.

They

named over ten cases that they want to topple by
statute, and easily five of them go to the core of the
modern nonintervention-minded Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the favorites that Barry just mentioned
— Matsushita, Brooke Group, Verizon, American Express,
Ohio.
The report says, “We have to clear these
obstacles out of the way.”

It is a recognition in the

report that these are risky and difficult cases to
bring with additional doctrine — not impossible.
The Court is not inflexibly averse to
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finding antitrust liability.

In the 2010 decade, the

FTC went three times to the Supreme Court and won
three in a row, in cases which at the table internally
at the FTC, the General Counsel’s Office said, “More
likely than not you’ll lose.”
three.

They prevailed in all

So it can be done, but it is an exceedingly

difficult journey to make.
What Congress is saying is, “We don’t care
if you lose.

At least play the match.

You won’t know

if you are going to lose until you play the match,
that’s why you play the match; and in parallel we will
do our best to try to change the law, to change these
defaults.
JAMES KEYTE:

Thank you.

Very provocative.

Do you have one sentence you want to give
me, Barry, and then I will say a few things and people
can go back to their tables.
BARRY HAWK:

Congress can do what

legislators have done throughout history — If they do
not like the law, they pass new legislation.

23

I think maybe, given everything that is
happening that we’ve talked about, five years from
now, despite this inhospitality tradition, my
prediction is that in some of these cases brought by
the agencies, the Supreme Court will decide in favor
of the agencies. This is what history teaches us.
JAMES KEYTE: My last comment is it is going
to be a very interesting year for sure, either way —
if it cuts through the courts or if we see generation
of some legislation and debate about that.

Certainly

by the time we have our live conference next year
there will be things to talk about.
BILL KOVACIC:

James, in the presidential

debate the one question I would like to ask Joe Biden
is: “Are you and your running mate in favor of the
House report or not?
JAMES KEYTE:

Would you take that package?”
That would be a very

interesting question, for which we typically do not
get straight answers from all politicians.
BILL KOVACIC: Well, take it seriously.

It’s
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on the table.
JAMES KEYTE:

We will know and we will talk

about that next year.
I do think, with the composition of the
Supreme Court, we even saw in Amex a pretty solid set
of facts for harming rivals and disadvantaging rivals,
but at the same time with a marketplace that was
growing dramatically, and the majority there had the
view that the consumers were not harmed in that
circumstance.
So it will be a very interesting potential
large collision down the road if these cases actually
come to fruition.
Thank you very much for our first Fireside
Chat.

I couldn’t have asked for two more important

and better people for this, and we will do it again
during the course of the year and then live again next
September or October.
I will turn everybody back to your tables.
You can stay there as long as you want.
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I will highlight that Freshfields is having
their similar event starting soon.
I would like to see everybody tomorrow
morning at the event with Kirkland & Ellis.

We also

have another set of keynotes and an in-house counsel
roundtable Karen Lent runs, which will be wonderful
and very relevant today.
Thank you both again very much.

